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The peculiar history of the Finnish-American radical community is filled 
with ideological and organizational battles, as is the case with other Finnish 
immigrant groups.* One of the culminating points in the disputes among the 
radical Finnish-Americans was reached in the spring of 1930. At that time 
a message was sent from the headqumers of the Communist International 
in Moscow, regarding the Finnish fraction of the American Comrnunist 
Party. The letter analyzed the special forms of activities of the Finnish 
fraction. On the one hand the Finns were given credit for good organiza- 
tional ability, but on the other hand their activities were seen as proof of an 
inability to get rid of national limits and to assimilate into American 
society.' The message was that contacts with Americans should be estab- 
lished on a more solid basis. The letter states among other things that 
Finnish workers must necessarily become apart of the revolutionary movement 
of the American working class. Amencanization is for them the most important 
step in order to become real internationali~ts.~ 
However, it is obvious that the purpose of the Cornintern was not to urge the 
Finnish irnmigrants to become a part of American capitalist society. The 
purpose was to prepare for the future American socialist ~ociety.~ 
The letter was an important link in a development that caused a large 
body of Firinish-American radicals to leave the Finnish fraction that had 
been affiliated with the American Comrnunist Party. The change was 
connected with the problem of the content and ideology of the 
Finnish-American communist movement, the relationship between the 
concept of the "real American" radical movement and the ethnic-oriented 
Finnish-American radicals. In this paper, the main course and background 
of this controversy is analyzed. 
The organizational and cultural life of immigrant groups in the United 
States were affected by several factors. One group of factors derives from 
the old country, its traditions, folk culture, customs, social and economic as 
well as political structures. The other group of factors derives from the new 
country, the United States. The immigrants earned their living in the 
American economic system, they were influenced by the Arnerican politi- 
cal and social system. Thus we may generalize that the form of immigrant 
comrnunity and its functions was and is a mixture of differing views and 
influences. It is a new product, in which new ways of associational life 
e ~ e r g e . ~  
There are several studies written about the history of the Finnish-Ameri- 
can radical movements. These works include earlier ideologically oriented 
history-books as well as newer scholarly works which try to analyze the 
reasons why the Finns in America were so eagerly attracted to workers' 
societies, socialist societies, IWW-groups (the syndicalist-oriented Indus- 
trial Workers of the World), and after the First World War also to the 
communist movement. Important also was the leftist-minded cooperative 
movement, in which many Finnish-Americans made an invaluable contri- 
bution to American hi~tory.~ 
Considering the history of the Finnish-Arnerican conimunity as a 
whole, the debate about "hall socialism" or "hall comrnunism" among the 
radical Finns started quite early. It was primarily connected with the 
question of the social activities (which also included "entertainment") as 
part of the functioning of workers' societies. These latter societies attracted 
almost one-third of the 150.000 Finnish immigrants who lived in the United 
States after the First World War. Other central organizations for the irnrni- 
grant Finns were the many churches, and at the turn of the century also the 
temperance societies. Anyway, the workers' societies, with their differing 
political views, gathered the workers of Finnish extraction in their halls and 
other meeting places. 
After the founding of the Finnish Socialist Federation in 1906, the FSF, 
the activities were organized around the growing number of workers' 
socialist societies. In 1919, before the great ideological split caused by the 
birth of the communist movement, there were 225 member societies in the 
FSF withmore than 10,000 active members. These societies included active 
theater groups, women's clubs, athletic clubs, sewing circles, agitation 
committees, etc. The geographical division of the existing societies reflects 
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the distribution of the Finnish population of Noah America in general- 
major centers were in the Midwestern states like Minnesota, Michigan, and 
Wisconsin, but also in the east in New York and Massachusetts, and the 
West in Oregon, Washington, and Califomia. Along with the socialist 
organizations there were a number of widely read Finnish-language 
newspapers, periodicals, and other p~blications.~ 
After the communist movement was bom the majority of the FSF joined 
it following lengthy ideological battles. The Finns formed the largest ethnic 
group in the legal communist movement, the Workers' Party of America, 
until the beginning of the Bolshevization crisis of 1924-25, with more than 
6,000 members of 40% of the total membership. The Bolshevization 
campaign ended in the expulsion or defection of several leading personali- 
ties of the Finnish fraction from the communist movement in 1925-3 1. 
Finally, the communists were defeatedinthe ranks of the wealthy and active 
Finnish-American cooperative movement, CCE (Central Cooperative 
Exchange), in the Midwest in April 1930.7 
It wasnot easy to persuade the Finnish-American communists to accept 
the new organizational structure ordered by the Communist International in 
Moscow. The ethnic federations were abolished from the American party 
and new international cells were established. In this way, it was believed, 
contacts with American workers could be established. Less than two 
thousand Finns actually joined the ~ e l l s . ~  The did not want to give up their 
rich ethnic social and cultural activities. They preferred to operate on the old 
organizational and language basis. 
One of the main reasons for the disagreements appears to have been the 
English language, the use of which immigrant Finns did not like. Because 
of the language difficulties in general the Finns have been prone to clannish- 
ness and inward-oriented activities. English was, of course, not a problem 
only for the Finns, for many other immigrants faced the same difficulties. 
This was recognized also by the American Communist Party and Comin- 
tern leaders? 
At the time of the Bolshevization crisis Finnishresistance was so strong 
that help from Moscow was deemed necessary. The Comintern sent its 
emissary, a well known former Finnish communist leader, Yrjo Sirola, who 
in the 1910s had spent years in the United States, to settle the differences 
between the Finns and the American Cornrnunist Party. Largely due to the 
efforts of Sirola the Finns yielded and the Finnish organization ceased to 
fimction. The leading Finnish-American communist of the period was 
Henry Puro (originaily John Wiita), who was the real organizer of the 
Bolshevization process among the Finns, and a member in the party Central 
Executive Comrnittee. Wiita describes in his memoirs the role of Sirola as 
that of a compromise builder. According to himit was Sirola who succeeded 
in making peace between the competing groups. It seems that Elis Sulkanen 
and Wiita were competing for the leadership of the Finnish radicals. Like 
Wiita, Sulkanen was an important federation official and newspaperman, 
who had mainly made his career in the Eastern states.'' Sulkanen was later 
in 1929 expelled with his closest supporters. 
A new organization, the Finnish Workers' Federation (in Finnish 
Suomalainen TyovaenJihjesto), was bom in the beginning of 1927. It was 
created after the leaders realized that about three-fourths of the Finnish 
members had been lost because of the Bolshevization process." It served 
as the connecting link for Finnish-American radicals, and it was not 
directly under the conp-ol of the American Communist Party. However, the 
contacts were obvious, and it supported the party line ideologically, finan- 
cially, etc. The members of the FWF could at the same time belong to the 
party cells, although everybody did not join them. The Communist Party 
also had an office, which organized the activities among the Finns. Actu- 
ally, the system appeared to be about the same as at the time when the com- 
munist movement did not yet exist and the Finns comprised the largest 
language federation of the Socialist Party of America, or at the time when 
the Workers' Party had not yet been reorganized through Bolshevization. 
However, a great nurnber of Finnish-American comrnunists were not 
happy after these organizational changes. More dissatisfaction had been 
caused by the interference of the American Communist Party headquarters 
and even the Cornintern. Both groups wanted to control the Finns, a most 
important element in the party because of their great number. Because of 
their continuing obstinate attitudes the Finns were accused of bourgeois, i.e. 
Social Democratic, leanings and tactics. Consequently , the Finnish-Ameri- 
can communist ranks were repeatedly puged in 1928-3 1. It was the period 
when several leaders and rank-and-file members were expelled from the 
FWF and the party.12 David Ahola interprets the Bolshevization process 
amsng the Finnish-Americans as an effort to lead them away from Social 
Democratic ideology and behavior.13 
It seems that the opposition critical of the party and the Cornintern was 
concentrated for the most part in the Eastern states, particularly New York, 
and the town of Superior, Wisconsin, in the Midwest. It was in Superior that 
the newspaper Tyomies was published. Its editors were influential in the 
Finnish-American radical circles, and in the reorganization process heresy 
was also found there. The same was the case with the Eastern Finnish news- 
paper Eteenpain. The Finnish Workers' Society of Superior was one of the 
largest and most active branches and also one which strongly favoured the 
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"old fashioned" activities. In the course of the disputes it was expelled from 
the Finnish Federation. 
The opposition, on the other hand, assailed the Finnish Federation for 
its dictatorialtreatment of members. The critics contendedthat rank-and-file 
members had no say in deciding the internal affairs of the organization and 
that all the activity was directed from party headquarters. The opposition 
would have liked to preserve the Finnish character of the FWF, whereas the 
leadership unconditionally favored pursuing the more international line 
proclaimed in the slogan urging all the workers of the world to unite. The 
debates and quarrels were keerily followed andreported in theFinnish radi- 
cal presss. During the late 1920s the papers were ovenvhelmed with 
accusations and counterattacks, reports from the meetings, information on 
the decisions of the party organs and the Executive Cornrnittee of the 
Finnish Federation, and now and then notes on somebody's ideological 
errors, and finally expulsions. Also the study of the minute books of the 
workers' societies of this period reveal how heated the discussions were, 
and how eagerly people joined in them.14 
At this point we have to remember that it was not only a question of 
ideology. An important element in the struggles was property: the eco- 
nomic control of Finnis halls, printing houses and machines, bookstores, li- 
braries, as well as the cooperative stores was a very important factor. 
Support of the opposition became so widespread that Moscow once 
again decided to interfere. Cornintern headquarters was most interested in 
the role of the Finns in the American communist movement. This was due 
to their great numbers in the party membership, but another explanation is 
apparently ihe fact that both Sirola and Otto Wille Kuusinen, another red 
refugee from Finland after the Civil War of 1918, had important positions 
in Communist International affairs. Later Kuusinenrose to great farne in the 
Soviet leadership until his death in the 1960s. The Comintern used to write 
to Moscow foreign leading comrnunists, especially in cases of ideological 
disputes. Thus, John Wiita with others in their turn had invitations to visit 
Moscow. 
The Comintern decided to send advisers to solve the problems in 
America. This time, it was the turn of Kullervo Manner, the former head of 
the unsuccessfulred revolutionary government in Finland in 19 18, who was 
accompanied by a women delegate, A. Morton. Manner mainly operated on 
the Canadian side dealing with the same type of organizational problems as 
those which were faced in the United States. 
A. Morton turned out to be Aino Kuusinen, the ex-wife of O. W. 
Kuusinen. Aino Kuusinen established her position in the Finnish-American 
communist movement in the years 1930-1933. She gained so strong a 
position that she even became the real leader of the federation. In achieving 
such a position she was greatly helped by her ex-husband's fame in 
international communist circles. Because of this she was able to carry out 
a number of organizational changes in the Finnish Workers' Federation. l5 
Further spread of opposition was therefore checked. It is likely that Ihe 
membership of the FWF reached its highpoint of 9,000-10,000 in 1932. 
Thereafter a continuing slowdownof activities and decrease in the member- 
ship began, at the same time as the Communist Party enjoyed broader 
support during the Depression decade. The FWF had dropped to 4,500 
members on the eve of the Second world War.16 
The short revival of communist sympathy among the Finns appears 
again to be based on "hall communism"-type activities. The meetings, 
libraries, sports clubs, theater groups, women's circles, etc. flomished and 
gathered people from the surrounding Finnish cornrnunity. However, with 
the exodus of some 6,000people of Finnish exeaction fromthe depression-hit 
United States and Canada to Soviet Kareliainthe early 1930s to build a "real 
workers' republic," as Reino Kero notes in his study, difficulties arose.17 
Also, the struggles on the cooperative front analyzed below, had an 
effect of lowering the Finnish membership of the communist group. One of 
the apparent reasons for this was the general inability-with few excep- 
tions-to athact the younger generation to the radical movements. The 
Finnish-American communist movement was ovenvhelmingly made up of 
, 
immigrants who had arrived before the First World War, since immigration 
from Finland to the United States was actually stopped after the adoption 
of strict quotas in the early 1920s. Thus the Finnish-American communist 
movement was composed of aging radicals with modest English language 
skills and with few oppoaunities to make personal contact with others 
outside the Finnish ethnic group.18 
During the early 1930s, however, there were problems on the coopera- 
tive front, which greatly endangered the future of the communist movement 
in America. A break-up of the Finnish cooperative movement in the Mid- 
west had been going on for some time because of disagreement about the 
tasks of the cooperatives in general. Great confusion was caused in July 
1929 by the demand for a "loan" of 5,000 U.S. dollars to the Communist 
Party by its leaders WilliamZ. Foster andMaxBedacht. Thereafter the CCE 
was repeatedly asked to supply money for communist activities. The central 
figure among the radical Finns and party liners at the time was Henry Puro 
(alias John Wiita).lg 
Especially at the conference of the CCE in the spring of 1930, it becarne 
clear that the radicals were a minority in the movement in the Midwest. The 
CCE adopted moderate political views, that is, they refused to turn the CCE 
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into a weapon of political engagement as the extremists urged. The radicals 
departed and formed a cooperative central organization of their own. It 
remained, however, considerably weaker than the CCE?O The CCE mem- 
bership originally included both many extreme radicals, people more or less 
sympathetic to the left, and also people with little or no political interest. 
From now on, the CCE concentrated mainly on the effort to promote the 
consumers' cooperative movement in the Midwest. 
In addition to actual trading business, the activities of the CCE may be 
defined as a form of extended "hall" activities. It was typical that many 
cooperative societies organized different kinds ol  social meetings, celebra- 
tions, educational courses, children's summer camps, etc. These activities 
were of the same type as those in general connected with the earlier socialist 
societies and workers' clubs as well as communist halls. The people in the 
cooperative societies were in many cases the same as those who had 
participated in the radical Finnish-American societies. Thus, it is no 
wonder that the activities in the cooperative stores and societies on the one 
hand and in the workers' societies on the other hand resembled each other 
quite a lot. 
Before the ideological battles began the CCE had about 20,000 mem- 
bers in one hundred member societies or stores. By 1941 the CCW (a new 
name, Central Cooperative Wholesale, adopted after the crisis) had grown 
to a phenomenal membership of 50,000 with 126 member societies. Now, 
the ethnic basis had been changed so that one-third were non-Finns?' So 
it seems that the cooperatives were doing what the Communist Party had 
been unable to do about organizing the Finns. The CCW was able to raise 
the membership by concentmting on the problems of everyday life. 
Thus, the general failure of the Comintern tactics in the period 1928-33, 
"the Third Period," resulted in continuous tactical and ideological battles 
and in the loss of membership. Comintem tactics were supposed to swing 
tlie workers to the left and to counter-attack capitali~m.~~ When this failed 
in America, the new tactics of the Popular Front were tested. However, the 
results were no better among the immigrant Finns. This appears to have 
been due largely to the actual composition of the communist group-it 
included both real committed communists and sympathizers who easily 
dropped 
In conclusion, it seems that social activities played a crucial role in the 
history of the radical Finns in America. According to orders from the 
Comintern the comrnunists tried to reformulate their activities, everyday 
tactics, and ideology. They failed, because they underestimated the role of 
ethnic features and activities. The temporary growth occurred in commu- 
nist circles was to a considerable degree based on halls and social activities. 
Ironically enough, this was true again after the period following the Second 
World War, when Finn halls, Finnish newspapers, and social get-togethers 
resumed a prominent place for Finns in the communist movement. Al- 
though a few younger Finns held notable positions in the party leadership 
(e.g. Gus Hall, the party general secretary), the majority became accultur- 
ated into the mainstream of American life and stayed out of leftist politics. 
The reasons for the failure of American comrnunism in general have 
been discussed by many histonans and social scientists with reference to 
economic, social, political, and ideological factors.24 It appears to be a fact 
that Finnish-Americans, too, were apt to accommodate themselves to the 
American system, its practices and beliefs, for practical reasons, mainly. 
However, the bonds within the Finnish subgroup appear to have been very 
strong. Traditions, personal contacts, linguistic factors, etc. played a very 
important role. Thus, when the Cornintern tried to solve American prob- 
lems by decisions that actually ignored the subgroup systems, its policies 
failed. The acculturation process analyzed here do confirm the conclusions 
presented by other scholars that the inner social and cultural systems of the 
immigrant groups are very persi~tent.~~ 
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